The literature on JIT production suggests a causal link between work-in-process inventory and manufacturing productivity.
I. Introduction
In the past decade manufacturing managers and academic researchers have dramatically changed their view of work-in-process (WIP) inventories. These inventories, held as a buffer between processing steps in manufacturing plants, were once considered essential for maintaining a steady production flow. But the wide acceptance of "just-in-time" (JIT) production has led to the contrary view that these inventories prevent the discovery of problems on the shop floor and can thus be detrimental to productivity. According to this new perspective, inventory reductions expose defects in the manufacturing process, forcing managers and workers to eliminate (rather than accommodate) sources of process variability.
Various authors have described the causal mechanisms linking inventory reduction to productivity growth (e.g., Schonberger, 1982; Hall, 1983) . Nevertheless, many questions remain unanswered. Does inventory reduction lead to productivity gains, or does it merely serve as an indicator that process variability has been reduced, so that less buffer stock is required? And if inventory reductions do stimulate productivity gains, how quickly do the gains appear, and what is the magnitude of effect?
Details of JIT implementation have been addressed in numerous case studies.'
Nevertheless, there have been few statistical analyses of the connection between work-inprocess inventory and manufacturing productivity.2 In this paper we investigate this connection using data for 52 Japanese automotive assemblers and parts suppliers over the period from 1965 to 1991.
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the diagram shows that the reduction of actual WIP lowers the costs of inventory holding and related activities, making an additional contribution to productivity (link 5).
It is useful to explore the mechanisms behind these links a bit deeper. We start with the distinction between actual and required WIP inventory. In any production line, WIP is used to protect the production flow from the variability and discontinuities of production.
In general, as variability rises and as discontinuities become more pronounced, more WIP will be necessary to achieve a certain level of output. Also, as the desired level of output approaches the effective capacity, more WIP will be necessary.
The minimum amount of WIP needed to guarantee the desired level of output for a
production line is what is called "required WIP inventory" in the diagram. Depending on how the line is managed, actual WIP inventory will fall behind, equal or exceed the required level.
When the gap between actual and required WIP inventory is made small (or negative), problems will arise, constraining or disrupting the production flow (link 1).
Workers or machines will become idle, either because they lack parts as a result of an upstream problem or, in a pull system, because they lack production authorization (e.g.
kanban cards) as a result of a downstream problem. The types of "problems" that may surface include machine failures, defective production, time-consuming machine setups, long transportation distances, unbalanced lines, and lack of coordination. Because workers and supervisors are often rewarded on the basis of the output of a particular machine or production stage, they will automatically direct their attention to the cause of idleness. It is this mechanism that is often referred to by the "rocks in the water" metaphor for JIT: the "rocks" on the bottom of the riverbed (the production problems) are exposed by lowering the "water" in the river (the amount of WIP inventory).
The diagram also shows a link that indicates that once the rocks are exposed, they will be removed from the river; in other words, detected problems will be solved. How, if, and when this will happen depends on the problem solving capabilities present in the factory. Sakakibar& et. al (1997) call JIT inhstructure. They find that more than inventory reduction itself, it is the presence of JIT inhstructure that leads to improvements in"performance. Essentially, once a problem surfaces, workers or teams of workers need to organize themselves to determine the root cause of the problem and design, test and implement a solution. Some solutions are quick, but others may take months or years to implement, as in the case of quality control mechanisms, machine maintenance procedures, or setup time reduction.
Link 2 in the diagram indicates that as a result of solving the problems that cause the need for WIP inventory, productivity will increase. The problems that cause the need for WIP inventory typically involve some type of production waste. When this waste is removed, whether it is waste of materials, waste of worker time or waste of machine time, productivity rises. In addition, if this problem solving causes the quality of the final product to be improved, the company may command a higher price for its product and reduce its costs for warranty programs, causing productivity to improve further.3
Problem solving may also lead to a reduction of the 'required' WIP inventory as indicated by link 3 in the diagram. For example, increased machine reliability will decrease the need for sizes economical.
Link 4 reflects buffer inventories, and reduced setup times will make smaller lot management's recognition that inventory requirements have fallen, so actual inventory can be reduced. In a production line that is controlled by kanbart cards for example, cards must be removed from the system to achieve such a reduction.
In MRP-type systems, inventories remain unchanged until the lead time estimates and lotsizes that are used as parameters in these systems are reset to lower values. The lag between the reduction in 'required' WIP and the reduction in actual WIP will depend on how tightly this link is managed.
3 A key~~umPtion is that tie~os~of problem solvingarcSmall compared to the benefits; i.e., problems that create a need for WIP inventory are usually not hard to solve but often fail to get attention. Most examples from the descriptive literature (e.g., Shonberger (1982) , Monden ( 1983) ) seem to satisfy this requirement
Finally, link 5 of the diagram indicates that the reduction of actual WIP inventory can lead directly to increased productivity. This can happen in several ways. The costs of inventory carrying and material management may fall. Also, as manufacturing lead times shorten, faster feedback will reduce the amount of scrap and rework as well as the need for safety stock in the finished goods inventory. Externally, these inventory reductions may allow quicker response to the market. In markets where this is important, product prices might be positively affected and so might productivity, measured appropriately.
The causal link diagram in figure 1 provides a framework for understanding the statistical models and for interpreting the results presented later in this paper. It also allows us to state the theoretical questions more clearly. Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate the model implied by Figure 1 directly, as we lack data on the problem solving processes that occur within firms. Rather, it is necessary to infer the linkages from time series observations of (actual) inventory and labor productivity across the sample of automotive companies.
Our primary tests are designed to detect evidence of links 1 and 2. Does inventory reduction play a role in stimulating (unobserved) problem solving and subsequent productivity growth? Or does inventory reduction simply arise in response to successful problem solving and improvements in productivity (links 3 and 4)? What is the typical magnitude of these effects, and how long are the lags?
The strength of these links and the speed of response may vary greatly across pkmts and fillllS. Note in particular that effective problem solving activity can occur without the existence of link 1. For example, implementation of quality control methods may enable the detection, analysis, and resolution of production problems, without any initial reduction in inventory. Moreover, long delays may arise in links 3 and 4 (reduction in WIP following process improvement) without jeopardizing the improvement process.
Indeed, we hypothesize that some firms rely on inventory reduction as a driver for process improvement, while others utilize different approaches and methods. Cusurnano (1985) contrasts the inventory-driven production system developed by Toyota with the -, . -more conventional MRP system implemented at Nissan.4 In our analysis we test whether the inventory-productivity linkages represented in Figure 1 are different, on average, between the Toyota and Nissan al%liates in our sample.
Data
The data sample includes a total of 52 Japanese automotive companies, covering nearly all of the Japanese assemblers and most of the largest parts producers. Findings are therefore likely to be representative of the Japanese automotive industry. The historical time series is sufllcient to allow observation of the adoption of JIT methods, which were introduced in Japan mostly from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.
Firms in the sample can be subdivided as follows. Eight are "core" assemblers that design, build and sell finished automobiles under their own name. Three are "contract assemblers," companies that assemble automobiles as subcontractors for the core assemblers.j The remaining 41 companies are "first-tier" parts suppliers, i.e., firms that supply parts directly to the assemblers. Table 1 lists the parts suppliers in the sample. About half maintain tight links with either Toyota or Nissan. We assigned suppliers to three groups based their sales percentage to Toyota and Nissan and their membership in "supplier associations" (Sake, 1996) .6 The firms at the top of Table 1 , which are all members of Toyota's regional "Tokai Kyohokai" association, were assigned to the Toyota group; those at the bottom of the Table, which all belonged to Nissan's "Takarakai" association, were assigned to the
Nissan group. These assignments are similar to other group definitions in the literature (e.g., Dodwell, 1983; Saxonhouse, 1980; Toyo Keiz.ai, 1991) . Three firms are closely afllliated with Isuzu. We classified these three and all remaining suppliers as "others.'"
The data are from Japanese annual financial reports covering the period from 1965 to 1991. The specific data items used in this study are: total company sales, value--added, total employment, fixed investment, and work-in-process inventories. These data are reported on a consistent basis by all publicly-traded manufacturing firms in Japan.*
The data on sales and value added correspond to flows over the fiscal year, while employment, investment, and inventones are measured as stocks at the end of the year.
Productivity Measure
Labor productivity, defined as real value-added per employee, is the productivity measure used in this study. (Value added equals the fhn's sales during the fiscal year, minus the costs of purchased materials and services.) For each firm and year, the productivity measure was computed by first converting the firm's reported value-added into constant yen (based on the Japanese wholesale price index for transport equipment), and then dividing by the average of beginning-and end-of-year employment. This yields real value-added per employee, a standard measure of labor productivity.
Since the 1960s, Japanese automotive firms have scored impressive gains in labor productivity. Nevertheless, the rate of productivity growth has been diminishing over time.9 Table 2 gives summary measures suppliers over the period from 1970 to 1990.
out; Toyota suppliers have also performed of labor productivity for assemblers and Toyota's performance, in particular, stands better than average, although by a much 7 Many of these "~thers"~@iciPatc in Toyota's "Kanto Kyohokai" and Nissan's "Shohokai" supplier associations, which have broad membership (Sake, 1994 Table 3 shows that Toyota has operated with very lean inventories, and key suppliers to Toyota have held much less WIP than the "other"
suppliers. However, the Nissan suppliers in the sample have maintained even lower average levels of WIP and a superior rate of inventory reduction.
Fixed Capital Investment
Labor productivity normally increases with the amount of fixed investment per worker. Differences in capital intensity reflect basic differences in production processes, as well as managerial choices about the degree of process automation. Much of the productivity growth in Japanese manufacturing since World War II can be attributed to rising investment per worker (_Norsworthy and Malmquist, 1981; Jorgenson and Kuroda, 1992; van Ark and Pilat, 1993) .
To control for the effect of capital investment on labor productivity, we include a measure of tangible fixed assets per employee in our regression tests. Tangible fixed assets equals the depreciated value of the firm's property, plant and equipment at the end of each fiscal year. This accounting measure was adjusted for inflation and divided by the firm's total number of employees to give an estimate of total investment per employee.
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IV. Periods of Substantial Inventory Reduction
Our first approach to characterizing the comection between WIP reduction and productivity growth is based on the observation that for most companies in the sample, there was a well-defined period when major inventory reductions occurred. To identi& these periods objectively, we applied a simple algorithm to the inventory data. We then tested whether the periods of inventory reduction coincided with changes in firms'
relative productivity growth and productivity rank. This analysis was limited to parts suppliers to avoid confounding the effects of inventory reduction with other productivity differentials related to firm type.
The algorithm for identifying periods of substantial WIP reduction was implemented as follows. For each firm we prepared the time series on the ratio of WIP inventory to sales. We then found the earliest year, if any, where the WI P/sales ratio for each of the next six years fell below a trajectory involving 4°/0 annual reduction, or more stringently, 8°/0 annual reduction. To establish the end of the period, we identified the earliest year for which the WIP/sales ratio fell within 20°/0 of the average ratio of the remaining years of data. 10 While these standards are arbitrary, the results proved robust to alternative identification procedures. 11 Figure 2 shows the periods of substantial inventory reduction that were identified by the algorithm. The supplier companies are grouped to reflect their links with the major assemblers. Within each group, the earlier adopters are listed first. Among the core assemblers, Toyota, Honda and Nissan began cutting in-process inventories during the 1960s or earliev the smaller assemblers followed in the 1970s. Among the supplier companies, those allied with Toyota tended to start cutting inventories several years earlier than most others. For six of the 52 companies, the algorithm was not able to find a .-.
., .,--meaningfhl period and it was clear on inspection that those companies did not display a period of substantial WIP reduction.
For the parts suppliers, we used two methods to test for differential productivity growth during the inventory reduction periods. The first method utilizes annual productivity rankings of the companies. The second method involves analysis of relative productivity growth.
In the first method, labor productivity within we ranked all of the parts suppliers in decreasing order of their each observation year. For the suppliers that satisfied the criterion for significant inventory reduction, we recorded their percentile productivity rank in the year prior to the start of substantial WIP reduction and one year after the end of this period.12 Table 3 reports the results. Of the 41 suppliers in the sample, 35 met the "4'Yo criterion" for substantial inventory reduction. Of these, 25 increased in productivity rank during their WIP reduction period, and 10 decreased in rank (significant at the .01 level).
Results are stronger using the more stringent criterion of 8% WIP reduction per annum.
This criterion was met by 33 suppliers, of which 26 increased in rank and 7 decreased (significant at the .001 level). Table 3 also reports the analysis of relative productivity growth during periods of substantial inventory reduction. In each observation year, we computed a relative productivity growth rate for each firm by subtracting the average productivity growth rate of suppliers fiwm the value shown for the company. During periods of substantial inventory reduction, firms exceeded the sample average by about 1.5°/0 to 2.0°/0
depending on the criterion used. These productivity growth differentials are highly significant statistically.
V. Correlation Between Productivity and Inventory Levels
Our second approach to assessing the inventory-productivity link was to use regression analysis to examine the correlation between labor productivity and the level of WIP inventory. Given that we have annual data for a cross section of companies (i.e., panel data) there are several ways that such a correlation might be observed.
We first investigated whether a negative relation between labor productivity and the WIP/sales ratio could be identified when companies are compared annually in crosssection, as demonstrated for the major assemblers in Lieberman (1990) . We found strong correlations of this type for the core assemblers in many observation years. For the parts suppliers, however, the correlation was significant only in the mid-1970s, when inventory levels varied dramatically across the companies.
One explanation for these results is that the suppliers are heterogeneous in their manufacturing processes, so their "required" levels of WIP inventory differ. This masks the inventory-productivity relationship when viewed in simple cross-section across firms.
To control for heterogeneous WIP requirements, we estimated a "fixed effects" regression model where the dependent variable is labor productivity, and each firm has a separate constant term which captures the differences in firm-specific factors. We also included time dummies in the regression to allow for annual changes in average industry productivity. The remaining explanatory variables are the WIP/sales ratio and the level of capital investment per worker, where the latter serves primarily as a control measure. 13
The estimates are shown in Table 5 . The error terms in this regression model are serially correlated; to correct, we used a first-order autoregressive adjustment. The WIP/sales coefllcient appears highly significant and its magnitude (approximately -.07)
implies that a 10°/0 reduction in WIP was associated with near] y a 10/0 increase in productivity, other things equal. Tests showed that the coeftlcient was consistent across time periods and did not differ significantly between assemblers and suppliers or among the keiretsu company groups. 14 The estimates in Table 5 show that higher capital investment per worker had a significant effect on labor productivity, as expected. The coefficients suggest that each 10% increase in per capita investment led to about a 1'%to 2!40gain in labor productivity.
One concern in this regression model is the potential for spurious correlation or simultaneity bias in the WIP/sales coefficients. For example, an unanticipated decline in sales could lead to a rise in the WIPlsales ratio as well as a decline in productivity. To check the possibility of bias, we estimated the equation using instrumental variables.
This led to no change in the resulting coefficient estimates, although the standard errors increased slightly due to the reduced efficiency of the estimator.
W. "causality" Tests
While the findings of the previous sections reveal an association between WIP and productivity, they give little information on the causal relations outlined in Figure 1 .
A deeper assessment requires the application of methods that can shed light on the time structure of the of the inventory-productivity interaction. In this section we report tests of "Granger causality," an approach commonly used in the econometrics literature to explore the nature of causation between two time-series variables (Granger, 1969; Pierce 14 me~oefflcient for the Ni~~an~omp~ies W= about h~f the magnitude shown for the full sample, but the difference was not statistically significant. When the sample was limited to the period after 1970, as in the regressions reported in the next section, the coetllcient for the contract assemblers fell significantly below that of other firms. One likely explanation is that the contract assemblers made most of their inventory reductions prior to 1970, as indicated in Figure 2 . and Hau~1977; Bishop, 1979; Geweke, Meese and Den& 1983; Bemdt, 1991) . Such tests determine whether lagged information on a variable, X, has any role in explaining Yt, after controlling for lagged Y and other factors. While these tests can establish precedence relations among variables that interact over time, they cannot demonstrate that these effects are causal in the conventional sense.
The theoretical model represented by Figure 1 implies that reductions in WIP may stimulate productivity gains (links 1, 2 and 5); and conversely, problem solving activities which lead to productivity improvement may feed back to reduce the level of WIP inventory (links 2, 3 and 4). Given that the anticipated relations between WIP and productivity go in both directions, we estimate two related regression models.
Effects of WIP Reduction on Labor Productivity
We first examined whether lagged and contemporaneous changes in WIP inventory have any ability to explain changes in labor productivity, after controlling for lagged productivity and changes in sales. The regression equation is:
where AVt is value-added per employee in year t, divided by value-added per employee in year t-1;
ASt is sales in year t, divided by sales in year t-1;
AWt is WIP inventory at the end of year t, divided by WIP at the end of year t-1;
AKt is fixed investment per employee at the end of year L divided by investment per employee at the end of year t-1;
and et is a random error term.
All variables were measured in logarithms, which allows the coefllcients to be interpreted in terms of growth rates. We include lags through year t-4, given that all coefficients became insignificant by the fourth year. To accommodate this lag structure, the dependent variable starts in 1970 for most firms.
Equation 1 can be viewed as a forecasting equation. Changes in labor productivity for a given firm can be predicted given information on the firm's historical productivity trend and the current and lagged growth of sales. The question posed by the "causality" test is whether this forecast can be significantly improved using additional information on changes in WIP inventory.
More formally, one would expect a firm's current productivity growth, AVt , to be largely determined by its lagged productivity (AVt-i) and by short-term fluctuations in sales (ASt-i), the latter being typically beyond the control of the firm.
The main hypothesis to be tested is whether, after inclusion of these two series in the regression equation, changes in WIP inventory (AWt.i) have a detectable impact on productivity (i.e., the~i terms in Equation 1 are jointly significant). Moreover, one would expect the coefficients for~i to be negative, assuming that reductions in inventory contribute to an increase in labor productivity.
Equation 1 also incorporates a test for the productivity effects of increasing capital investment per worker (AKt.i). The Ii coefficients should be positive, assuming that investment leads to higher labor productivity. These coefilcients may also reveal a gestation lag for new investment to become effective, as documented previously by Chew et al. (1990 Chew et al. ( , 1991 .
Determinants of Changes in WIP Inventory
Our second regression equation tests for the potential feedback of successfid problem solving on the level of inventory holdings (i.e., links 2,3 and 4 in Figure 1 ): Given the system of simultaneous relationships represented by equations 1 and 2, estimation by ordinary least squares may lead to biased estimates of the coefficients. In particular, AWt and AVt are endogenous.
To avoid erroneous estimates, the potential simultaneity bias must be tested, and if necessary, corrected.
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in Labor Productivity
Estimates of equation 1 are reported in Tables 6a and 6b . The first three regressions cover the full sample of 52 companies; all remaining regressions are for groups of firms as indicated. The OLS estimates were found to be free of simultaneity bias, based on a Hausman test.]b However, the error terms were found to be heteroskedastic; as a correction, we report t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (robust) standard errors.
The regressions in Table 6a show that as expected, productivity was strongly influenced by contemporaneous changes in controlling for sales and productivity trends, in productivity. 17 In the regressions for sales, ASt. Moreover, they show that after changes in WIP inventory preceded changes the fill sample (6.2 and 6.3) the AWt.l 15 our imPlicit~~umption is that the lags~sociated witi link 2 in Figure 1 are very short.
16
We aPP]ied the fo[lowing Ha~sm~test for simultaneity bias (Bemdt, 1991, pp. 379-380) : Fitted values of AWt were obtained from reduced form regressions on the exogenous and predetermined variables, and these values were added as explanatory variables in equations 6.2 and 6.3. The fitted values were not significant in these regressions, indicating that the hypothesis of simultaneity bias in the AWt coefficients can be rejected. coefllcients are negative and highly significant, implying that inventory reductions were followed by productivity gains, with a lag of about one year. The AWt and AWt.2 coefficients are negative but smaller in magnitude, denoting some productivity gains in the year of inventory reduction and two years after. The AWt-3 and AWt.4 coefficients are insignificant, indicating the absence of Ii@her impact after two years. The total effect is given by the sum of the AWt coefficients, which is about -0.10. This implies that a 10VOreduction in WIP inventory contributed to about a 1'Mo increase in productivity on average across the sample. Regression 6.3 includes the AK terms, which capture the productivity effects of changes in investment per worker. The AK coefllcients, which are jointly significant, suggest a gestation lag of one or two years for new investment to become effective. The coefficients sum to about 0.20, which implies that a 10°/0 increase in capital per worker led ultimately to about a 2V0increase in labor productivity. The addition of these controls for capital investment has no appreciable effect on the WIP coefficients.
We performed tests to determine whether the effects of WIP reduction were consistent across the company groupings. In Table 6a the sample is broken down into assemblers and suppliers; in Table 6b the sample is divided into three groups: ( 1) Toyota affiliates, (2) Nissan affiliates, and (3) "Others." Some minor differences between assemblers and suppliers are shown in Table 6a .
There is evidence that the assemblers had a slightly longer gestation lag between inventoty reduction and productivity gains. Their AW coefficients remain significant into the second year, with fi,uther possible effects in the third year. Moreover, the total magnitude of effect (sum of the coefllcients) is larger on average for the assemblers than for the suppliers.
These differences were confirmed by tests (shown in Table 7 ) to determine whether sets of coef%cients differed significantly between groups. 18The test
that compares the set of AWt-i coel%cients between assemblers and suppliers has a pvalue of 0.036, indicating that the hypothesis of identical coefficients can be rejected at the 5% level. Table 6b shows larger differences between groups defined on the basis of company afllliation. Regressions 6.8 and 6.9 suggest that the lag between WIP reduction and productivity gain was about six months shorter for the Toyota group than for other companies. Moreover, Regressions 6.10 and 6.11, which are limited to the Nissan affiliates, reveals that these firms had no significant productivity gains following reductions in WIP. These differences among company groups are confirmed by the test statistics in Table 7 .19 The contrast between Toyota and Nissan groups is consistent with differences in the operations practices of the two assemblers, as discussed by Cusurnano (1985) .
A graphic illustration of these results is provided in Figure   impact of WIP reduction on productivity (obtained by summing the Table 6b ). The Toyota and "other" company groupings display 3, which plots the AW coefllcients in similar cumulative productivity effects, although the impact of WIP reduction is more immediate and perhaps more persistent for the Toyota companies. By comparison, the absence of such effects for the Nissan afilliates is striking. Tables 8a and 8b give the regression estimates of equation 2 on the determinants of inventory chartges.20 While these regressions explain only a small proportion of the Table 7 gives significance "levels obtained using the Wald test wcommended by Geweke, Meese and Dent (1983) .
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in WIP
Results of F-tests were very similar.
19 Differences be~een the _foyou~d Niss~groupswe significant at the 5% levei, as are the differences between the Toyota group and "Others," Differences between the Nissan group and "Others" are significant at the 1?4.level.
20 we te5ted the5e OLs~e~ressions for simul~eity bim in the AVCoefflciertts, using a Hausman test analogous to the one described in footnote 18. Results indicated that the OLS estimates were unbiased. Although tests showed the absence of significant heteroskedasticity, we report t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, as in The conceptual framework outlined in Section II implies that WIP reductions should follow improvements in productivity, although the lag time for adjustment may vary. The regressions in Table 8 provide mixed evidence of such effects. While the AVt-i coefficients are generally negative, as expected, none of the individual terms are statistically significant except in the regressions for the Toyota group. (The tests in Table   7 confirm that the Toyota group coefficients are significantly different from the rest of the sample.) Compared with other companies, the Toyota affiliates made faster and more consistent reductions in inventory following improvements in the manufacturing process. Figure 4 illustrates this finding. For the Toyota companies on average, a 1YOproductivity gain was followed within about a year by a 1.7°A reduction in WIP. Other firms also cut their inventories over time (as indicated by the summary ratios presented earlier in Table   2 ), but without such a tight coupling.
The AKt.i coefilcients in Table 8 
VII. Discussion and Perspective
The preceding sections of this paper present various tests for a connection between WIP inventory and productivity, based on historical data for the Japanese automotive sector. In this section we consider the findings in broader perspective.
All the tests show a strong and statistically significant comection between inventory and productivity. None, however, can fully distinguish among the causal links shown in Figure 1 . As illustrated in the Figure, an association between inventory and productivity can arise in several ways. One chain of causality begins with successful problem solving, which leads to productivity gains (link 2) and subsequent inventory reduction (links 3 and 4). In this case WIP reduction plays no role in stimulating productivity, but is purely a response to successful problem solving. Could this be the dominant chain of causality underlying the empirical results? The tests in Sections IV and V are silent on this issue, but the analysis in Section VI is informative. One piece of evidence is the finding of a relatively weak connection between productivity gains and subsequent inventory reductions, except within the Toyota group. By comparison, the links in the opposite direction (WIP reductions preceding productivity gains) appear larger and more pervasive. These precedence relations suggest that the dominant path leads from WIP reduction to productivity growth, rather than vice versa.
Ambiguity nevertheless remains with respect to the exact mechanisms linking inventory reduction to productivity gains. To what extent does it occur via links 1 and 2
(embodying the "rocks in the river" metaphor for JIT), as opposed to link 5 (inventory reduction economizes on working capital and other inputs)? We expect the former to be more important, for a number of reasons. Schonberger (1982) and others have argued that the benefits associated with link 5, which are costs, are comparatively small. In the Japanese primarily savings in inventory holding automotive industry we estimate that ,.. -these holding cost economies amounted to at most one-third of the average productivity gain.22 Mo~ver, most of the holding cost savings would be immediate, whereas we typically observe the productivity gain with a lag.
These assessments are based on the assumption that the WIP-productivity connection reflects the outcome of successful problem solving activity. To some extent, though, the observed correlations could stem fkom factory setbacks. Unanticipated problems may cause a temporary drop in productivity (link 2) and a build-up of WIP inventory (links 3 and 4). While such effects may be present in our data, they are likely to be comparatively small. One reason is that such setbacks should have an immediate impact on both productivity and inventory, whereas the analysis shows significant lags.
Moreover, in the Japanese automotive industry the strong prevailing trend was toward WIP reduction and productivity growth, rather than vice versa.
One issue that warrants greater discussion is the precise interpretation of the time structure associated with the coefficients in the Granger causality tests. Given that some variables are end-of-year stocks while others are annual flows, a shift of one-half year is appropriate in some cases .23 In Table 6 , for example, the lag between WIP reduction and productivity gain was likely to have been about six months shorter than what would otherwise be implied by the regression coefllcients. Suitable adjustment suggests that productivity gains were almost immediate for the Toyota companies, as compared with a lag of about one-half year for non-Toyota suppliers, and one year for assemblers. In Table 8 , the flow variables such as AV are shifted by six months in the opposite direction.
22 [n our -P]e, tie WIp/v~ue.~ded ratio pe~ed at 16.3% in 1967, falling MOW 1W. from 1977 onward. Assuming a 15% ratio and a 15% annual holding COSLa 10% reduction in WIP amounts to a holding cost savings equal to 0.225% of value-added. This is less than one-third of the estimated productivity gain.
23 Assume for pupses of illus~tion mat a reduction in WIp inventory [cads to an immediate gain in productivity.
The dependent variable in Table 6 , AVt, is the change in value-added per worker (a flow measure) between year t-1 and year t. The explanatory variable, AWt, is the changeirrthe stockof WIPinventov,rne=uredfromtheendof year t-1 to the end of year t. A reduction in W[P made at the midpoint of year t would be foIlowed by an immediate rise in the firm's value-added, but the increase in productivity, as recorded by AVt, would app= half in yew t md half in the next year. In the regression analysis of AVtone would observe coetlicients of equal magnitude for AWt and AWt. 1, with coefficients of zero for the additional lagged tern. This is approximately what is shown for the Toyota group (regressions 6.8 and 6.9).
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Here, the coefficients for AVt and AVt. 1, which are statistically significant for the Toyota group, should be interpreted as reflecting lags of 0.5 and 1.5 years between productivity gains and subsequent inventory reductions.~4
To put the findings in perspective, it is helpfi.d to compare the magnitude of productivity gains attributable to inventory reduction with the gains attributable more broadly to other factors. The WIP coefllcients in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that as a rough approximation, each 10°/0 reduction in WIP contributed to art average increase of about 1'?40in labor productivity. Producers that made substantial inventory reductions (as identified by our algorithm) cut their WIPlsales ratio by about two-thirds, on average.
Combining these estimates leads to the conclusion that for such firms, the aggregate productivity gain attributable to inventory reductions was typically about 10'%o.In other words, labor productivity was 10°/0 higher at the end of the sample period, as compared with the hypothetical case where the firm would have made no inventory reductions at all.?j While a 10?40productivity differential is appreciable, it is important to recognize that from 1970 to 1980, when most of the inventory reductions were occurring, labor productivity for the sample companies grew at an average amual rate of 9'?40.Thus, the estimated effects of inventory reduction correspond to less than one-tenth of the total productivity gains recorded during the 1970s.
The cumulative impact of WIP reduction on labor productivity can also be compared with the effects of increased capital investment. From 1970 to 1980, real fixed capital per worker rose by 5.1 YO per year on average across the sample. Using an elasticity of 0.15, which is suggested by the regression coefficients in Tables 5 and 6, this 24 This~ai~etic Possibility hat Avt+~shouldbe inCIU&d as an explanatory variable in Table 8 . When tested, this measure had a negative coetllcient that was weakly significant but comparatively small.
25 A similm compu~[ion~be m~e using the estimates of relative labor productivity growth in Table 4 . Firms that made substantial inventory reductions (based on the 40/o criterion) experienced productivity growth during this period that was, on average, about 1.5% above the growth rate of other firms. Multiplying this figure by an average reduction period of about 6-7 years (consistent with Figure 2 ) yields a total differential productivity gain of about 1oYO.
.-.
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increase in capital intensity translates into a labor productivity gain of about 10°/0over the course of the decade. Thus, the productivity gain that can be linked to inventory reduction during the 1970s may have been roughly the same magnitude as the gain from increased capital investment. Taken together, these estimates imply that most of the rapid growth in Japanese automotive productivity during the 1970s was derived from manufacturing process improvements not directly related to capital investment or inventory reduction.2s
VIII. Conclusions
The findings of this study shed light on the linkages between WIP inventory and productivity.
We have considered alternate paths of causality and have derived quantitative estimates of effects. The results are complementary with the large body of case study evidence on the implementation of JIT manufacturing. Indeed, our work demonstrates that quantitative analysis of public company data can provide insights for researchers and practitioners in operations management, a field with little tradition of statistical data analysis.
Our findings suggest that for most companies in our sample, inventory reductions were followed by productivity gains. We find more limited evidence of effects in the opposite direction. In quantitative terms, each 10°/0 reduction in inventory led to an average gain of about 10/0in labor productivity, with a lag of about one year. Firms that made substantial inventory reductions enjoyed a period of annual productivity growth significantly higher than that of other companies on average. Typically, these firms also saw an increase in their productivity rank.
While these effects were widespread in the Japanese auto industry, inter-firm differences are apparent, particularly between the Toyota and Nissan groups. For the firms aflliated with Toyota the inventory-productivity linkage appears very tight:
productivity gains followed quickly after inventory reductions, and inventories were cut soon afler the achievement of productivity gains. For the Nissiin tilliates, however, neither of these effects was observed. "Other" companies in our sample showed a significant link in one direction only (from inventory to productivity), and with a longer lag than that detected for the Toyota group. Despite these differences in estimated effects, over the two decades of sample coverage most of the companies in the sample achieved major inventory reductions, and all attained substantial productivity growth.
Taken jointly, these observations support our hypothesis that many Japanese firms relied on inventory reduction as a driver for process improvement, although some utilized other approaches and methods.
While broadly consistent with prior research, these findings offer new and quantitative insights regarding the effects of JIT implementation. Nevertheless, important caveats apply. The findings presented here are aggregate estimates, far removed from details of the shop floor where JIT implementation actually takes place.
Such details undoubtedly matter, and the estimates obtained in this study are averages that mask heterogeneity across individual firms, plants and processes.
Most importantly, it is well known that inventory reduction is only one component of JIT; related activities (such as setup time reduction and statistical process control) are essential. It may be impossible, and perhaps not meaningful, to distinguish the impact of WIP reduction from that of these other activities. Indeed, the WIP reductions observed in this study may serve in part as a proxy for these other activities, with which they are correlated. Thus, the quantitative findings of this study should be kept in perspective and regarded as rough benchmarks only.
. . manufacturing process (leading to variabilityy, discontinuity or waste) wi H be detected. * Reduced setup times (higher machine utilization and q When WIP is low, the delays between the occurrence of a problem and the detection of a less labor cost). problem become shorter. Table 4 .
Tests for Productivity Changes During Periods of Substantial Inventory Reduction
Total number of suppliers in sample 41 41
Minimum requirement for "substantial inventory reduction"
4% 8%
(per annum reduction over 6 year period)
Number of suppliers exhibiting "substantial inventory reduction" 35 33
Number whose productivity rank increased 25 26
Number whose productivity rank decreased 10 7
P-value (binomial test)
.
.001
Differential productivity growth rate 1.51'?40 1.98?40
(average, per annum, during inventory reduction period)
P-value (t-test)
.01 .001 Table 5 . (AW coefficients in Table 6) .
Regression Analysis of Labor Productivity

036
.013
.027
.001
Change in WIP following change in Productivity (AV coefficients in Table 8) .
259
.001 .000
.113
q Tests were performed by constraining the coefficients indicated (for years t through t-3) to be identical between groups, with all other coeftlcients allowed to differ. Table gives %gnficantatthe 5% level, two-tailed test.
Utuui
Y3ignkant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
